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Abstract. Using three quantitative measures of Central Bank independence, we apply OLS
and TSLS regression methods to investigate the possible correlation between political liberty,
political instability and central bank independence. For a sample of Western democracies and
highly democratic developing countries we show that Cukierman’s legal independence index
is positively correlated with political freedom and regime political stability. It is negatively
correlated with party political stability. For a sample of developing countries that excludes
dictatorships we show that a special index of legal central bank autonomy is positively asso-
ciated with political freedom and political stability. Finally, we observe that, for the same
sample of nations, the turnover index of central bank independence is not sensitive to our
political variables.
1. Introduction
In recent years economists have shown an increasing interest in how politi-
cal and social institutions affect monetary policy and performance. Numer-
ous studies have demonstrated a clear link between political and monetary
instability.1 The recognition of this link has encouraged other economists to
examine the impact of political factors on the behavior of institutions that
influence monetary policy. The most important among these institutions are
the central banks, which play an increasing role in economic-stabilization
efforts.2
To date, the research on this topic is very limited. The two most prominent
contributions, Cukierman(1992) and De Haan and Siermann (1996), have
examined the impact of various kinds of political instability on the inde-
pendence of central banks. Other studies focusing on the same issue often
ignored the importance of political factors. These investigations are confined
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to Western economies which operate within a democratic framework of rel-
ative political stability. These studies are reviewed in Eijffinger and De Haan
(1996).
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of political institu-
tions on the independence of central banks, based on comparative analysis
of cross-country data. We consider political stability and political freedom
as the main factors defining the political character of a country. By showing
how political institutions can affect the independence of a central bank, we
hope to provide a better understanding of how monetary policy in economies
in transition can be affected by the nature of political changes and reforms.
Our study differs from previous efforts in three important aspects. First, in
addition to the political instability affecting the conduct of the central bank,
we also consider the impact of political liberty. As Posen (1995) has shown,
the activities of anti-inflationary pressure groups (e.g., the financial sector)
have played a significant role in promoting central bank independence. Since
the formation and effectiveness of political pressure groups depend to a large
extent on the level of democracy of a regime, we can infer that there is some
linkage between the degree of political freedom and the independence of a
central bank. Second, rather than following Cukierman (1992) and De Haan
and Siermann (1996) who use very narrow measures defining political insta-
bility, we adopt a different measurement through the use of comprehensive
indexes which involve a larger number of political variables. Third, since the
weakness of the tax collection system increases the reliance upon the infla-
tion tax in many developing countries, we put an emphasis on the relationship
between the size of the tax revenue and independence of the central bank.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the recent liter-
ature. Section 3 presents the theoretical arguments regarding the impact of
political and economic institutions on the independence of central banks in
developing countries. In Section 4, the reader will find model specification
along with the discussion of data and methodology. The analysis of empirical
results will be presented in Section 5 followed by the summary and conclu-
sion in Section 6.
2. Review of the literature
Existing literature on the impact of political factors affecting central bank
independence (CBI) is primarily limited to political instability. No standard-
ized definition of the term “political instability” has been used in empirical
studies. Cukierman’s study (1994), for instance, investigated the impact of
two types of political instability: (a) party political instability and (b) regime
political instability. Party political instability (PPI) refers to the frequent
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change of government between competing political parties such as left wing
and right wing, within a political regime. When the PPI is high the ruling par-
ty realizes that it could easily lose power in the next election. Fearing that the
opposition party might use the monetary policy to monetize budget deficits,
the ruling politicians prefer to delegate the power over monetary policy to an
independent body (central bank). Hence, Cukierman hypothesizes a positive
correlation between PPI and central bank independence.
The regime political instability(RPI) measures the frequency of irregular
changes of political regime such as revolution, coup d’etat, etc. Under high
degrees of RPI a ruling regime is foremost preoccupied with its short term
survival. The regime, therefore, has an incentive to use a flexible monetary
policy to accommodate its tax and fiscal policies. For such a regime, subordi-
nation and flexibility of monetary authorities are more important than cred-
ibility of monetary policy. Cukierman, therefore, hypothesizes that RPI has
a negative effect on central bank independence. Using quantitative indexes
of PPI and RPI constructed by Haggard, Kaufman, Sharif and Webb (1991)
for fourteen middle income nations, Cukierman (1992) demonstrates that, as
expected, party political instability has a positive correlation and regime po-
litical instability has a negative correlation with central bank independence.
In a similar study, De Haan and Siermann (1996) use the number of reg-
ular (change of political party) and irregular (coup) government changes as
proxies for political instability. Based on data for 43 developing countries,
they find a negative relation between irregular government change and central
bank independence. In another study, De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) regress
several measures of central bank independence for 21 industrial countries on
the frequency of government changes from one party to another with sig-
nificant ideological difference. They find that party political instability does
not have a significant impact on CBI. Finally, Cukierman and Webb (1995)
compare the probability of a central bank governor being replaced after a
regular and an irregular change of government. They find that the probability
of replacement after an irregular change of regime (a coup or revolution) is
much higher than a regular transfer of power.
3. Political setting and Central Bank independence
In many of the economies in transition, the nature and magnitude of the inde-
pendence of a central bank are greatly influenced by the extent to which the
government in power is relying upon the effectiveness of the central bank
for monetary stabilization. We argue that, under a given set of political con-
ditions, the degree of central bank independence chosen by a government
generally depends on two considerations:
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Figure 1. Political regime types and political stability.
(a) the relative importance of monetary stability and monetary expansion
(inflation tax revenue) as two conflicting economic goals for a govern-
ment; and
(b) whether monetary stability, if desired, could be achieved without increas-
ing the autonomy of the central bank.
A government will give some degree of independence to a central bank
if, first of all, that government considers monetary stability to be its priority.
As a second condition for CBI, the government must believe that a central
bank’s autonomy is the only way to achieve such a stabilization goal. These
considerations depend not only on the existing economic conditions but also
on the political characteristics of that country. The political factors that we are
concerned with in this study are political liberty and political stability. The
different combinations of liberty and stability that could exist in a country are
shown in Figure 1. Following Cukierman’s (1994) analysis we differentiate
between regime and party political instability as was noted above.
Under a dictatorial regime, the question of central bank independence is
rather irrelevant. Since, in a dictatorship, there is no real separation of pow-
ers and no constitutional guarantee for the rule of law, even the nominal inde-
pendence of the central bank in the legal system is meaningless. This point
is important because many developing countries imitate the financial laws
of the Western industrial countries for the sake of prestige and internation-
al approval. Furthermore, a dictatorial regime can oppress the pro-spending
social groups and establish monetary stability without an independent central
bank.3
In a semi-democratic country which is undergoing a democratic transi-
tion, the presence of both regime and party instability is possible. During
the transition period some democratic institutions germinate but at the same
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time there is a real possibility that certain powerful pressure groups (e.g., the
armed forces) might undermine the democratic process. This political insta-
bility along with the potential for monetary instability is harmful to invest-
ment and economic growth. At this stage, central bank independence could
act as a precommitment device and increase public confidence in monetary
policy. Hence, the financial sector and some business leaders will support
more central bank independence. However, as explained below, the political
pressure for monetary expansion in democratizing countries is stronger and
will prevent any increase in the central bank autonomy until later stages of
democratization.
The reasons for deterioration of monetary stability in early stages of democ-
ratization are as follows. As a country enters into a democratic transition
stage, the low income social groups will use their newly gained political
power to press for increased social expenditures. Evidence for this political
behavior and its economic consequences is provided in many empirical stud-
ies. Analyzing budgetary allocations in four industrial countries over a peri-
od of one hundred years, Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan (1989) demonstrate
a positive statistical relation over time between rising power of the working
class, the rising per capita income and the increasing provision of health,
education, and welfare programs by these governments. Similarly, Meltzer
and Richard (1983) explain the impact of democratic reform on government
expenditures by arguing that the lower income groups have an incentive to
support more spending after they gain the right to vote. As a result, as more
and more social groups gain the right to political participation, the govern-
ment expenditure in welfare and social programs, and consequently the share
of government expenditures in GDP will increase.
Governments can finance the increased expenditure by a) raising more tax-
es, b) borrowing from the public and c) borrowing from the central bank.
However, because of the existing instability and the inefficiencies of the
financial markets, it becomes increasingly difficult for the government to
borrow from the public. Therefore, the government must rely either on more
taxes or on monetary expansion to finance the new expenditures. Develop-
ing countries suffer from various degrees of tax evasion and inefficient tax
management (Burgess and Stern, 1993). In countries that the tax system is
more efficient and the ratio of taxes to GDP is larger, budget deficits will be
smaller and there will be less need for a dependent central bank to monetize
the debt. Hence, we hypothesize a positive relationship between the tax rev-
enues, as a percent of GDP, and the central bank autonomy. Furthermore, in
semi-democratic countries, we hypothesize a negative relationship between
central bank independence and regime instability.
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As the democratic institutions take root and independent political insti-
tutions gain more strength, the financial sector emerges as an independent
interest group with strong anti-inflationary orientation (Posen, 1993). Usual-
ly this interest group supports one of the major parties (e.g., the Republican
Party in the United States), while the pro-spending, pro-job creation inter-
est groups dominate the other party. Finally, as a democracy reaches to the
highest stage of maturity, the direction of monetary policy in general and cen-
tral bank independence in particular, will depend on the balance of political
power between the pro-stability and pro-spending interest groups.
The only type of instability observed in a mature democracy is party polit-
ical instability where political power moves back and forth between leading
political parties with different economic ideologies. As described in Cukier-
man (1994) the party that supports monetary stability, when in office, is wor-
ried about the possibility of monetary expansion by the pro-spending par-
ty, if and when it gains control of the government. Hence, when the party
political instability is high, the pro-stability party will try to insulate mone-
tary policy against executive and legislative political pressure by delegating
authority over it to an independent central bank. Therefore, we hypothesize
a positive relationship between party political instability and central bank
independence in mature democracies and in countries in the final stages of
democratic reform.
4. Statistical model and data
In order to test our hypotheses, we regress various indexes of central bank
independence on quantitative indices of political liberty and political stabili-
ty. The regression models basically include three distinct categories of inde-
pendent variables. We formulate the regression model as:
CBI = f(political institutions, Tax/GDP ratio for explicit taxes, governmen-
t’s deficit financing policy).
The dependent variable:Three quantitative measures of central bank inde-
pendence are used for the dependent variables. Two were recently developed
by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). We introduce a third. These indices
are:
1) The Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (CWN) Legal Index: This is a compos-
ite index of legal central bank independence hereafter referred to as CWN
index. The CWN index covers 72 nations. It accounts for a large number of
legal factors that affect the autonomy of central banks.4 A demonstrated in
Cukierman et al. (1992), this index offers a far better measurement of central
bank independence as compared to earlier indices. Furthermore, they show
193
that, for industrial nations, its correlation with measures of monetary perfor-
mance is statistically significant. The CWN index and an unweighted average
of its components have been used in several recent empirical studies of CBI,
primarily because the scope of all other indexes is limited to the industrial
nations.5
2) The turnover index: This is an index of the turnover of the central
bank governor. It indicates how frequently the governor of a central bank
is replaced. The turnover index is an indirect index of central bank inde-
pendence. Cukierman, et al. (1992) argue that in developing countries legal
independence might not be an accurate measure of actual central bank inde-
pendence. Their regression analysis does not show a significant correlation
between (CWN) Legal index and the inflation rate in developing countries.
Instead, they claim that frequency of change of central bank governor shows
how independent the central bank actually is. The fast turnover of the cen-
tral bank governor in a country is viewed by Cukierman, et al. as a sign of
central bank dependency. The turnover is high because as soon as a central
bank governor opposes the policy dictates of the president, he is replaced by
a more obedient person. Cukierman (1992) compares the turnover index for
industrial and developing nations (average turnover during 1950–1989) and
shows that for industrial nations the average is significantly smaller.
3) The Less Developed Countries (LDC) Legal Independence Index: This
is a narrow index of legal central bank independence (hereafter referred to
as the LDC index,) which is more suitable for measurement of CBI in devel-
oping countries (LDCs) than the CWN index. We construct this index as
the average of three of the seventeen parameters that were originally used
by Cukierman et al. (1992), for construction of the CWN index. Banaian,
Burdekin, and Willett (1998) have shown that out of the seventeen parame-
ters used by Cukierman, only three had a negative and significant correlation
with the inflation rate in developing countries: 1) the term of office of the
Central Bank Governor; 2) the provisions for conflict resolution; and 3) the
type of limits on lending procedures from the central bank to the govern-
ment. These are the three factors that we use to calculate the LDC Index. In
the empirical analysis section of this article, we will also demonstrate that the
turnover index and the LDC index are more relevant for monetary stability in
developing countries than the CWN index.
In our regression analysis we use the ten-year average of the CWN legal
independence index as reported by Cukierman et al. (1992) for the period
1980–89. The sample includes 20 industrial and 52 developing countries list-
ed in the appendix. This index varies between 0 and 1. A larger value indi-
cates a higher level of independence. The LDC legal index is also the ten-year
average for the same period and has the same range. The turnover index is
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calculated by dividing the total number of changes of central bank governors
in each country by ten to obtain the average annual turnover rate for the same
decade (1980–89). A high value of this index for a country is viewed as an
indication of less central bank independence.
Independent variables:
a) Indices of political freedom and political stability. For measurement of
freedom we use Gastil’s index of political liberty. This index is calculated
annually for most nations and is reported in the January issue of Freedom at
Issue.6 The range of this index varies between one and seven. A highly demo-
cratic society receives a score of one while a repressive dictatorship is ranked
seven. We use the ten year average of this index for the period 1980–89.
We utilize two different measures of political instability. First, the Index of
Regime Instability is constructed as the average of an index of revolution and
coup, and an index of assassination. Both of these indices are reported in Bar-
ro (1991). We use the ten-year average of this index (1980–89) as a measure
of the regime political instability. Second, the Political Risk Index is calcu-
lated by the Political Services International as part of their comprehensive
publication known as International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
The Political Risk Index ranges between 0 and 100. A higher score indi-
cates a higher level of political stability. Since ICRG annual data are propri-
etary data, we obtained the five-year average of political risk index (1985–89)
from Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996).7 Unfortunately the data for this vari-
able for the earlier years are not available. However, since political conditions
for most countries during the 1980s changed rather slowly, we consider the
1985–89 average of political risk index as a close proxy for the 1980–89
average8.
The political Risk Index is a weighted average of 13 political factors that
have a significant impact on political stability. Many of these parameters are
intended to measure regime political instability such as: frequency of coups
and revolutions, potential for civil war, frequency of political assassination
and political power of the military. In stable democracies the values of these
indicators are small or near zero.
The political Risk Index also includes factors that capture the types of
political instability that could arise within a well functioning democratic
framework. The most important among these factors is the indicator of polit-
ical culture within and among political parties which is highly similar to
the Index of Party Political Instability that was used by Cukierman (1994).
Therefore, we expect the Political Risk Index and the Party Political Instabil-
ity Index to be highly correlated for the democratic countries. In less demo-
cratic countries we expect the Political Risk Index and the Regime Political
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Instability Index to be highly correlated. In our sample, for Western democra-
cies, the correlation between Political Risk Index and Regime Political Insta-
bility Index is –0.11. For less democratic developing countries that are not
under full dictatorship, it has a much larger value, –0.52.
b) Tax ratio.This is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP of each country. We
use two indicators of tax effort: (a) total tax revenue as a percent of GDP;
(b) income tax revenue as a percent of GDP. The averages of these two ratios
are calculated from the data shown in Table 2 of Burgess and Stern (1993).
We hypothesize that there exists a positive relationship between these tax
variables and the CWN and LDC indices of legal independence, and a nega-
tive relationship with the turnover index.
c) Indicator of reliance on inflation tax and deficit monetization. We use the
funds borrowed from monetary authorities as a percent of domestic financ-
ing, as our indicator of deficit monetization. The data for this variable were
obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Sta-
tistics Yearbook. In a recent empirical study Sikken and DeHaan (1998)
have demonstrated that, in developing countries, more central bank inde-
pendence reduces deficit monetization. We believe that the causal relation
between monetization and CBI runs both ways. At the same time that CBI
affects monetization, the desire of a government to monetize the deficit will
affect her attitude towards central bank independence. Governments that are
more dependent on monetization will grant less independence to their cen-
tral banks. Because of this two way causality, we treat the indicator of deficit
monetization as endogenous and apply the two stage least squares method.
5. Regression results
The results of our regression analysis are summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
We will discuss the results for the three indices of central bank independence
separately.
(a) Legal independence of Central Bank.The data in Table 1 show the corre-
lates of the legal central bank autonomy (CWN index) based on ordinary least
squares regressions. The sample of observations used for these regressions is
limited to democratic and semi-democratic countries in their late stages of
democratization. In regression models 1 and 2 Political Risk Index is used as
an indicator of party political risk. As mentioned earlier, for the highly demo-
cratic countries as a group, the regime political instability is very low. Hence,
the differences in value of Political Risk Index reflects differences in par-
ty political instability. On the other hand, the sample observations for these
regressions cover some democratizing developing countries that might still
be experiencing some regime political instability. Therefore, in addition to
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the Political Risk Index, the index of regime political instability (which only
measures coup, revolution and assassination,) is also included in the model.
The values of the adjusted R2 and the F statistics for each model in Table 1
indicate that the proposed equations have good explanatory power for the
CWN index. The sample of observations for model 3, denoted by C, has
a larger number of developing countries than model 2, which has a larger
number than model 1. Consequently, the additional countries in sample C
are less democratic than the ones in sample B, which are less than those in
sample A.
The index of political liberty has a significant coefficient with the expect-
ed sign in the second and third models. (Since the sample observations of
the first model are limited to highly democratic nations, the index of politi-
cal liberty does not have enough variation to give a significant coefficient.)
This means that higher levels of political repression are associated with low-
er levels of legal central bank independence. The index of regime political
instability has the expected negative sign in all regressions: higher levels of
regime political instability are associated with lower levels of legal indepen-
dence.
The Political Risk Index (which is an indicator of party political instabil-
ity for mature democracies and regime political instability for less demo-
cratic ones), has the expected negative sign. Based on Cukierman’s (1994)
hypothesis, we expect higher levels of party political stability to be linked
with lower levels of central bank independence. The negative sign of Political
Risk Index confirms this hypothesis. As we noted above, the differentiation
between regime and party political stability is more meaningful for highly
democratic nations. Our data confirm this conjecture: as we enlarge the sam-
ple size by adding a larger number of less democratic countries (sample C in
model 3), the correlation between the two political instability indices increas-
es and the coefficient of one of them becomes insignificant. In other words,
Political Risk Index in sample C (which includes less democratic nations,)
captures a great deal of variations of the regime political instability.
The only independent variable that does not carry the expected coefficient
sign is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. However, the coefficient of this vari-
able is statistically insignificant in all of regressions. Perhaps this outcome
is due to the fact that more than 60 percent of the observations used in these
regressions are from industrial nations in which financial markets are more
efficient and deficit monetization is minimal. Thus, the tax revenue constraint
does not constitute an important determinant of central bank independence.
Table 2 shows the correlates of the LDC index. Banaian et al. (1998) have
used principal component analysis to show that the three components of this
index are the most relevant measures of legal central bank independence for
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Table 1. Correlates of legal Central Bank independence
Dependent variable
CWN index of legal independence
(Sample of obs. limited to democratic and
semi-democratic countries only.)
Independent variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Inverse Index of Political –0.027 –0.09 –0.05
Liberty (V1). (0.75) (0.03) (0.03)
Index of Regime Political –0.03 –0.03 –0.018
Instability (V2). (0.08) (0.05) (0.22)
Political Risk Index (V3) –0.004 –0.004 –0.003
(0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
Tax Revenues as % of GDP –0.002 –0.001 –0.002
(V4) (0.24) (0.37) (0.33)
Dummy variable for Germany, 0.3 0.31 0.31
Switzerland and Austria (0.0001) (0.00) (0.0001)
Constant 0.78 0.84 0.71
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of observations 27.0 33.0 39.0
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.43
F-statistic 6.59 8.09 6.81
Prob. of F-stat. (0.0007) (0.00009) (0.0001)
Sample restriction Sample A Sample B Sample C
Note: Regressions were estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares method. All
three models were tested for Heteroskedasticity. The critical value of T-Statistics
are given in Parentheses.
The index of legal central bank for these three countries was much higher than
others and introduction of this dummy variable significantly increased the qual-
ity of regressions.
Sample A is limited to those countries for which the Gastil’s inverse index of
political liberty was less than or equal to two.
Sample B is limited to those countries for which the Gastil’s inverse index of
political liberty was less than or equal to three.
Sample C is limited to those countries for which the Gastil’s inverse index of
political liberty was less than or equal to four.
Correlation coefficients for the independent variables, (Sample A), are:
(V1,V2) = 0.03, (V1,V3) = –0.40, (V1,V4) = –0.05, (V2,V3) = –0.23,
(V2,V4) = 0.005, (V3,V4) = 0.14.
developing countries. Our data confirm that conclusion when the inflation
rate is regressed on the CWN, LDC and turnover indices in Equation 1.
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D =  0:66 LDC+ 0:44 CWN+ 0:36 Turnover  0:004 PolRisk+ 0:31
(0:011) (0:15) (0:009) (0:01) (0:01)
Adjusted R2 = 0:41 N = 30 F  stat = 6:16 (0:001)
(1)
Sample is limited to developing countries only. D= Inflation/(1-Inflation);
the transformed inflation rate as reported in Cukierman et al. (1992), LDC
= Index of legal CBI for developing countries, CWN = Cukierman, Webb
and Neyapti index of CBI, PolRisk = Political Risk Index, Turnover = the
rate of turnover of the central bank governor. The critical probabilities of the
T-statistics appear in parentheses.
While the LDC and the turnover indices have significant coefficients, the
coefficient of the CWN index is rather insignificant. This implies that the
CWN index is not a determinant of inflation in developing countries. As we
had expected, a higher rate of turnover leads to more inflation while a higher
level of LDC index will diminish it.
In Table 2, the sample of observations we use to estimate models 4, 5, and
6 is limited to those developing countries that are not experiencing full dic-
tatorships. Specifically, it excludes countries with a score of five or higher
in Gastil’s inverse index of political liberty. The political instability of these
countries is more of a regime instability than a party instability. Therefore, the
Political Risk Index reflects regime political instability for developing coun-
tries and as was mentioned earlier, it is highly correlated with the Regime
Political Instability Index.
Thus, in the sample of developing countries, regressing the LDC legal
index on more than one stability index leads to a multicollinearity problem.
To avoid this problem, we estimate the coefficient of each stability index in
a separate regression. Furthermore, to avoid heteroskedasticity problems in
models 4, 5, and 6, we rely on the weighted least squares technique. We use
one over Gastil’s index of political liberty as the weight for each observation.
This will give more weight to the more democratic countries in our sam-
ple. The quality of regressions as shown by Adjusted R2 and F-statistics is
acceptable.
Models 4 and 5 in Table 2 show that there is a positive correlation between
political stability and LDC index of Legal CBI in developing countries. The
coefficient of the Political Risk Index has the expected (hypothesized) posi-
tive sign. The index of regime political instability has the expected negative
sign, but it is not statistically significant. Overall, these results are in line
with the earlier findings of De Haan and Siermann (1996), who find that
a negative correlation exists between irregular political change and central
bank independence. In model 6 we find a negative correlation between polit-
199
Table 2. Correlates of the index of legal central bank independence for devel-
oping countries.
Dependent variable
The LDC index of legal independence
(Sample of obs. limited to democratic and
semi-democratic developing countries only.)
Independent variables Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Political risk index (V1) 0.009
(0.04)
Index of regime political –0.026
instability (V2) (0.45)
Inverse index of political –0.07
liberty (V3) (0.09)
Income tax revenue as 0.007 0.01 0.01
% of GDP (V4) (0.3) (0.11) (0.1)
Constant –0.23 0.29 0.43
(0.36) (0.001) (0.00)
No. of observations 18.0 19.0 21.0
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.72 0.76
F-statistic 31.7 25.03 33.6
Prob. of F-stat. (0.00) (0.00001) (0.0001)
Note: Regressions were estimated by the Weighted Least Squares method
to correct for heteroskedastisity. One over Gastil’s index of political liberty
was used as the weight for all regressions. The critical probability value of
T-Statistics are given in parentheses.
Only those developing countries with a score less than 5 on Gastil’s inverse
index of political liberty are included in the sample.
Correlation coefficients for the independent variables are:
(V1,V4) = 0.38, (V2,V4) = –0.15, (V3,V4) = –0.23).
ical oppression and the LDC index; this confirms our hypothesis that central
banks enjoy more independence in more democratic developing countries.
Finally, we find a positive coefficient value for the ratio of income tax to
GDP in all three regressions although its level of significance is only 10 per-
cent. Those developing countries with a more effective tax collection system
are likely to have central banks with greater independence.
Correlates of the turnover index:Correlates of the turnover index of CBI are
given in Table 3. The sample of observations is limited to developing coun-
tries but excludes the highly dictatorial nations for which the notion of CBI is
meaningless. Since a higher rate of turnover represents a lower level of CBI
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we expect a negative coefficient for the Political Risk Index, which measures
political stability, and a positive coefficient for the index of regime politi-
cal instability. Contrary to our expectation, in equations 7 to 9 we observe
that the index of political liberty and the two indices of political instability
have insignificant coefficients. Furthermore, the ratio of taxes to GDP is also
insignificant. The only variable that is significant is the deficit monetization
index that has a positive sign as it was hypothesized.
The model is fairly robust with respect to alternative specifications. Repeat-
ing the regressions with alternative functional forms we arrive at the same
results. However, while our models are unable to demonstrate a direct cor-
relation between political instability and the Turnover index, there might be
an indirect linkage through the deficit monetization variable. As explained
before, higher levels of instability lead to larger deficits and hence, more
deficit monetization by the central banks.
Political stability and tax effort are not significantly correlated with the
turnover index. Yet they are significantly correlated with the LDC index of
CBI. It is important to note that the Turnover and the LDC indices affect
the rate of inflation in developing countries; therefore, they could be consid-
ered as reliable measures of CBI for these nations. The statistical correlation
between these variables is 0.01 which implies essentially no correlation at all.
These two indices measure two different things. Only one of them is direct-
ly influenced by the level of political instability and political freedom. The
results of Tables 2 and 3 lead us to conclude that higher levels of political
stability and political liberty are significantly linked with the higher levels of
CBI in developing countries.
6. Summary and conclusion
In this study we use three indexes of central bank independence to analyze the
impact of political factors on central bank autonomy in industrial and devel-
oping economies. Using a set of composite indexes for political freedom and
political stability, we obtain the following results from our regression analy-
sis. From a sample of developing countries in various stages of democratic
transition, our analysis leads us to conclude that the relevant index of legal
central bank independence has a positive correlation with political freedom
as well as political stability. Furthermore, legal central bank independence
reaches a relatively higher level in developing countries where tax revenues
are effectively collected. For both the Western democracies and the develop-
ing countries in advanced stages of democratization, party political instability
often leads to higher levels of independence of the central bank while regime
political instability creates the opposite effect.
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Table 3. Correlates of the turnover rate of Central Bank Governor in devel-
oping countries (1980–1989)
Dependent variable:
The turnover index (log)
Independent variables Model (7) Model (8) Model (9)
Inverse index of –0.05
Political liberty (V1) (0.51)
Index of regime political –0.06
instability (V2) (0.30)
Political risk index (V3) 0.018
(0.15)
Total taxes as % of GDP –0.017 –0.01 –0.01
(V4) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33)
Credit borrowed from monetary 0.79 0.61 0.92
authorities as a ratio of (0.014) (0.03) (0.03)
domestic financing
Dummy variable for 1.16 1.15 0.98
Argentina (0.001) (0.0009) (0.022)
Constant –1.22 –1.42 –2.49
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
No. of observations 23.0 23.0 24.0
F-statistic 5.98 7.22 4.33
Prob (F-statistic) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.011)
Note: Method of two stage least squares was used in estimation of these
regression models. Credit borrowed from monetary authorities as a ratio of
domestic financing is regarded as endogenous. The instruments used for esti-
mation of this variable are: industrial output as a ratio of GDP, Total tax rev-
enue as % of GDP, Inverse index of political liberty, index of regime polit-
ical instability country credit risk index and the index of political risk. The
numbers inside the parentheses are the critical probabilities of T-statistics.
Sample of observations is limited to the developing countries with a score
smaller than six in Gastil’s index of political liberty.
Correlation coefficients for the independent variables are:
(V1,V4) = –0.19, (V2,V4) = –0.33, (V3,V4) = 0.37.
The regression results for the turnover index show that this measurement
is not sensitive to either political freedom or political stability. It remains
insensitive also to the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. The only variable that
has a significant relationship with the turnover index is the portion of the
budget deficit that has been monetized by the central bank. The monetization
of public debt may be attributed to the political instability of the country. As
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we had expected, in countries with a higher rate of monetization of the budget
deficit, the turnover rate of the head of the central bank is relatively higher.
Notes
1. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) provide a comprehensive review of literature on this issue.
2. For a review of empirical and technical arguments in support of central bank independence
as an institutional device for monetary stability see Fischer (1995). Arguments against
central bank independence are reviewed in Bowels and White (1994).
3. For a survey of different views on the ability of dictatorships to resist rent-seeking pres-
sures by various interest groups see Skalnes (1993).
4. The CWN index is a weighted average of seventeen variables which address a) the terms
of appointment and dismissal of the director of the central bank, b) role of the central bank
in formulation of monetary policy, c) objectives of the central bank, and d) obligations of
the central bank towards the financial needs of government. We have analyzed the first
three categories.
5. The other measures of central bank independence are constructed by Alesina (1988),
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Eijfinger and Schaling (1993, 1995). These
indexes are measured for industrial countries. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996, p. 28) cal-
culate the correlation of these and Cukierman indexes for a set of common nations. They
show that these indexes have relatively low correlation.
6. Gastil’s index is one of several political rank indicators. In recent economic literature
this index has been used more than others. For an evaluation of the positive and negative
aspects of these rankings see Bollen (1986).
7. The Electronic version of Erb et al. (1996) is available at the following web site: WWW.
Duke.edu/ charvey/Countryrisk/ We obtained the multi-year average of the political risk
index from this electronic version.
8. Searching for alternative indices of political instability, for which data is available for
1980–89 period, we also considered the Country Credit Rating Index (CCRI). This Index
is calculated by International Investor Corporation as a composite index measuring eco-
nomic, political, and financial risk for each country. The correlation between CCRI and
political risk index for our sample of nations was 0.6. When replacing this index for the
political risk index in our regression models the estimation results did not change.
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Appendix
Names of countries included in the data set
1) Democratic countries (countries with score of 1 in Gastil’s Index of Political
Liberty): Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark,
France, Germany (former West), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, The UK, The USA,
Venezuela.
2) Semi-democratic countries with strong democratic institutions( 1<Gastil’s Index
<= 3): Bahamas, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Finland, Greece, Hon-
duras, India, Israel, Malta, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Thailand.
3) Semi-Democratic Countries with weak democratic institutions (3<Gastil’s Index
<=5.5): Argentina, Egypt, Hungry, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Qatar, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, West Samoa,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
4) Non-democratic Countries (5.5<Gastil’s Index): Chile, China, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Kenya, Romania, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zaire.
Note: The Gastil’s average index of political liberty represents the status of these
countries during 1980s. The political conditions in many countries have changed
ever since.
